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Abstract
In a recent paper [12], we discussed the serious inconsistency present within the operational and math-
ematical definition(s) of the notion of pure state. Continuing this analysis, in this work we attempt to
address the role of ‘purity’ and ‘mixtures’ within two different categorical approaches to QM, namely,
the topos approach originally presented by Chris Isham and Jeremy Butterfield [27, 28, 29] and the more
recent logos categorical approach presented by the authors of this article [10, 11, 13]. While the first
approach exposes the difficulties to produce a consistent understanding of pure states and mixtures, the
latter approach presents a new scheme in which their reference is erased right from the start in favor
of an intensive understanding of projection operators and quantum superpositions. This new account
of the theory, grounded on an intensive interpretation of the Born rule, allows us not only to avoid
the orthodox interpretation of projection operators —either as referring to definite valued properties or
measurement outcomes— but also to consider all matrices (of any rank) on equal footing. It is from
this latter standpoint that we conclude that instead of distinguishing between pure and mixed states
it would be recommendable —for a proper understanding of the theory of quanta— to return to the
original matrix formulation of quantum mechanics presented by Werner Heisenberg in 1925.
Keywords: pure state, mixture, quantum mechanics, graphs.
1 Pure States and Mixtures in Textbook QM
Today, the orthodox textbook formulation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) taught in all universities around
the world makes use of the notion of pure state. This notion, in turn, plays an essential role within the
many debates taking place within the foundational and philosophical literature about QM and Quantum
Information. Although historically the notion of pure state began to be mentioned, in the context of QM,
during the late 1940s —specially in relation to statistical theories—, the main ideas behind it were already
presented by Paul Dirac in his famous book, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics [17], published in 1930.
Following the positivist understanding of physical theories, Dirac argued that it is “important to remember
that science is concerned only with observable things and that we can observe an object only by letting
it interact with some outside influence. An act of observation is thus necessarily accompanied by some
disturbance of the object observed.” In line with the positivist stance, Dirac also stressed the superfluous
role of (metaphysical) representations: “it might be remarked that the main object of physical science is
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not the provision of pictures, but the formulation of laws governing phenomena and the application of these
laws to the discovery of phenomena. If a picture exists, so much the better; but whether a picture exists of
not is a matter of only secondary importance.” Dirac was then forced to address the sudden appearance of
measurement outcomes from quantum superpositions, a notion that was regarded by him as kernel to the
new theory: “The nature of the relationships which the superposition principle requires to exist between
the states of any system is of a kind that cannot be explained in terms of familiar physical concepts. One
cannot in the classical sense picture a system being partly in each of two states and see the equivalence
of this to the system being completely in some other state.” In order to solve the positivist dilemma
of quantum observability Dirac introduced a “quantum jump”1 between the mathematically represented
quantum superposition and the single observed measurement outcome [17, p. 36]. This new jump would
become the famous “collapse” of the quantum wave function. During the posterior decades and up to our
days, the need to justify Dirac’s “solution” to the positivist dilemma became to be regarded as the most
essential problem of QM itself. Something that the community of physicists and philosophers working in
QM would name simply as “the measurement problem”.
It is important to notice that, from a mathematical viewpoint, instead of considering matrices right
from the start —as Heisenberg had done originally—, Dirac grounded the formalism of the theory only
in terms of vectors. Let us recall that a unit vector, which in Dirac notation is written as a ket |x〉, can
be seen as a rank one matrix through the following operation |x〉〈x|. Indeed, if H is an n-dimensional
complex vector space, H = Cn, and B(H) is the space of n× n matrices, then we can relate the space of
vectors H with the space of matrices B(H) through the following map:
ν : H → B(H), ν(|x〉) := |x〉〈x|.
Let us mention two relevant properties of ν. The first one is that ν is not surjective. In fact, its image
is equal to the set of rank one matrices. The second relevant property of ν is that it is injective. Hence,
we can think of the space of vectors as a subset of the space of matrices. In other words, the vector
space is much “smaller”2 than the matrix space. An important feature of the vectorial formulation is
that, unlike the case of Heisenberg’s matrix formulation, there always exist a basis in which the unit
vector is represented by a single term —instead of a superposition of them. And, of course, following
Born’s rule, within this preferred basis the probability of observing this particular property is equal to
unity. Consequently, unlike the general case of superpositions, such bases provide certain (probability =
1) knowledge of what will actually be the case if a measurement would be performed.
Later on, this same idea3 became explicitly introduced within the main postulates of the theory through
the definition of the notion of pure state. As we have discussed in detail in [13], the notion of purity is
operationally defined: ‘If a quantum system is prepared in such way that one can devise a maximal test
yielding with certainty (probability = 1) a particular outcome, then it is said that the quantum system is
in a pure state.’ In turn, the notion of maximal test allows to interpret a quantum observable as being an
actual property —i.e., a property that will yield the answer yes when being measured [37].
Definition 1.1 (Operational Basis-Dependent Purity) Given a quantum system in the state |ψ〉,
there exists an experimental situation (or context) in which the test of it will yield with certainty (probability
= 1) its related outcome.
However, as remarked in [13], there is also a mathematical definition according to which, the pure state
of a quantum system is described by a unit vector, |ψ〉, in a Hilbert space. This definition has no physical
counterpart and makes reference to a purely abstract mathematical feature of vectors, namely, that when
considered in terms of density operators their norm is 1, that is, ρ is a pure state if Tr(ρ2) = 1, or
equivalently4 when ρ = ρ2.
1A notion that Bohr had made popular some decades before within his proposed model of the atom.
2“Smaller” in the sense that ν is an injection, and hence, the space of vectors is included in the space of matrices.
3An idea which is also explicitly present in EPR’s definition of their element of physical reality.
4A density matrix can be diagonalized, thus giving a set of eigenvalues 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ . . . < λn ≤ 1 with ∑i λi = 1. If
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Definition 1.2 (Mathematically Invariant Purity) An abstract vector in Hilbert space Ψ without any
reference to a specific basis.5 Or in terms of density operators, an operator ρ which is a projector where
Tr(ρ2) = 1 or ρ = ρ2.
In this case, the notion of pure state is obviously non-contextual (i.e., independent of the basis). The
abstract vector Ψ makes reference to the state |ψ〉, but also to any rotation ∑ ai|ϕ〉i (see for discussion
[4]). As remarked in [13], this latter definition is not consistent with the previous one. While the first
operational definition —which has the purpose to secure the existence of an observable which will be certain
if measured— is explicitly contextual (i.e. basis dependent) but not invariant, the latter mathematically
abstract definition of pure state is invariant (with respect to the trace) but lacks an operational content.
Within the orthodox literature, in order to consider the original space of matrices containing all the
operational content of the theory, the notion of pure state was extended to density operators. Let H
be a Hilbert space. A density operator ρ (i.e. a positive trace class operator with trace 1) is called a
state. Being positive (and self-adjoint), the eigenvalues of ρ are non-negative and real and it is possible to
diagonalize it. If the rank of ρ is equal to 1, this diagonal matrix is given by (1, 0, . . . , 0) and ρ is equal
to vv† for some normalized vector v ∈ H. In this case, ρ is called a pure state. For example, the vector
α|0〉+ β|1〉, |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, gives the following density matrix:
ρ =
(|α|2 αβ
αβ |β|2
)
Notice that, if ρ is a pure state (i.e., Tr(ρ2) = 1), there always exists a basis in which the matrix can be
diagonalized as:
ρpure =
(
1 0
0 0
)
Given this link between vectors and matrices, it quite is easy to re-introduce the missing matrices of
rank grater than 1 (or equivalently if Tr(ρ2) < 1). These were, of course, already present in Heisenberg’s
original formulation which made no distinction whatsoever between matrices and their rank. In the
orthodox literature these re-introduced matrices became known as mixed states; or in short, mixtures.
Unlike the case of pure states, mixtures could not be represented as a unit vector, |ψ〉. Instead, mixed
states were conceived as mixtures of pure states and mathematically represented as their convex sums:
ρmix =
∑
i
pi ρ
pure
i =
∑
i
pi |Ψi〉〈Ψi|
Thus, while pure states guaranteed the existence of an observable which, if measured, would be obtained
with certainty (probability equal to 1), mixed states did not. There is no single experimental context of
measurement (i.e., no single basis) for which a mixed state will predict with certainty a yes-no answer for a
specific observable. Mixtures provide uncertain knowledge regarding the pure state in which the quantum
system is really supposed to be in. In this way, mixtures are able to introduce an ignorance interpretation
of outcomes within the quantum formalism itself. As remarked by Nancy Cartwright [3]: “The ignorance
interpretation asserts that each member of the collection is in one of the pure states in the sum —it is only
our ignorance which prevents us from telling the right pure state for any specific member.” Thus, contrary
to the case of pure states, when considering mixed states, all observables are uncertain; they all possess a
probability which pertains to the open interval (0, 1). But unlike quantum superpositions which possess
indeterminate or potential properties, mixtures can be interpreted in terms of ignorance about pure states.
As remarked by Cartwright: “The ignorance interpretation is the orthodox interpretation for mixtures,
and should not be confused with the ignorance interpretation for superpositions, which has been largely
Tr(ρ2) = 1, then λ1 = . . . = λn−1 = 0 and λn = 1. Hence, rk(ρ) = 1 and then ρ = |v〉〈v| and ρ = ρ2. Conversely, if ρ = ρ2 it
has eigenvalues 0 or 1, but from
∑
i λi = 1 it follows λ1 = . . . = λn−1 = 0 and λn = 1. Hence, Tr(ρ
2) = 1.
5Like in [11] we distinguish here between the purely abstract vector Ψ and its specific representation in a basis |ψ〉.
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abandoned.” In order to make things more explicit, we can consider as an example of a mixed state (i.e.,
Tr(ρ2) < 1) the following diagonal matrix,
ρmixed =
(
1
2 0
0 12
)
Here, the observables related to the diagonal elements have probability 12 and consequently, it is orthodoxly
claimed that this mixed state provides minimal knowledge about the actual quantum (pure) state in which
the system really is. Before making the measurement, there is an equal 50 percent chance of obtaining
either of the two possible results, so we do not know in which pure state the system is.
As discussed in detail in [13], the just mentioned distinction between pure states and mixtures was in-
troduced in order to support a twofold foundation. On the one hand, an empirical-positivist understanding
of physics as an algorithmic mathematical device capable of predicting observations with certainty; and
on the other, an atomist metaphysical understanding of physical reality in terms of systems constituted
by definite valued properties. These two interconnected presuppositions have severe inconsistencies when
related to the orthodox mathematical formalism of QM. It is only the contextual definition of pure state
which provides the possibility to find out in a concrete case if the concept is true or false. Or in other
words, it is only one basis between the infinitely many existent basis which contains a physical operational
content. However, the mathematical non-contextual definition of pure state, which is not equivalent, lacks
completely such operational reference. This is clearly problematic, for there is no obvious link between the
contextual and the non-contextual definitions of pure state. Things become even more complicated when
we shift our attention to mixed states in which case there is no clear operational counterpart beyond the
reference to pure states –which are already ill defined.6 The reference to ‘mixtures’ —as contra-posed to
‘pure states’— has also become extremely problematic within the specialized literature, specially in the
context of quantum information. It is a difficult problem to determine if a mixed state is separable or
not [33]; something which is essential within the research of quantum information processing given the
orthodox definition of entanglement in terms of separability.
In the following sections we would like to turn our attention to the way in which two categorical
approaches to QM have addressed —in radically different ways— the meaning of pure and mixed states.
On the one hand, the topos approach and on the other, the more recent logos approach presented by the
authors of this paper.
2 Pure States and Mixtures in the Topos Approach
The topos approach, originally proposed by Chirs Isham, Jeremy Butterfield and Andreas Do¨ring [19, 21,
20, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31], presents a line of research that has been continued in different ways by researchers like
Chris Heunen, Bas Spitters, Klas Landsman, Vasilios Karakostas and Elias Zafiris. The topos proposal can
be regarded as a neo-Borhian categorical formulation which, taking as a standpoint the Kochen-Specker
theorem, stresses the contextual character of QM. Motivated by Bohr’s idea that the empirical content
of quantum physics is accessible only through classical physics the topos approach attempts to provide
a mathematical way to make sense of QM. But before entering the specific proposal of the topos, let us
provide some basic mathematical notions regarding category theory.
First of all, a category consists of a collection of objects (often denoted as X,Y,A,B), a collection of
morphisms (or arrows, denoted f, g, p, q) and four operations,
• To each arrow f , there exists an object dom(f), called its domain.
6While classical mixtures make reference to the ignorance of an underlying preexistent actual state of affairs, quantum
mixtures —due to the non-existence of a joint probability distribution [38]— are simply incompatible with such a (classical)
ignorance interpretation; and even worse —just like quantum superpositions [6]—, quantum mixtures lack a reference beyond
measurement outcomes and mathematical structures.
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• To each arrow f , there exists an object codom(f), called its codomain.
• To each object X, there exists an arrow 1X , called the identity map of X.
• To each pair of arrows f, g such that dom(g) = codom(g) there exists a composition map, fg such
that dom(fg) = dom(g) and codom(fg) = codom(f).
An arrow f is often denoted as f : X → Y to empathizes the fact that dom(f) = X and codom(f) = Y .
We say that an arrow f : X → Y is invertible if there exists an arrow g : Y → X such that fg = 1Y and
gf = 1X . The collection of arrows between X and Y is denoted hom(X,Y ).
Example 2.1 The first example of a category is the category of sets Sets. Another example is the category
of graphs. The category of graphs, denoted Gph, extends naturally the category of sets. A (simple) graph
is a set with a reflexive and symmetric relation. More formally, G is a graph if
• Reflexivity: P ∼ P for all P ∈ G.
• Symmetry: if P ∼ Q, then Q ∼ P for all P,Q ∈ G.
Elements of the graph are called nodes and an edge between two nodes is present if these two nodes are
related. Arrows between graphs send nodes to nodes and edges to edges.
A remarkable fact is that the collection of categories has itself a structure of a category. The arrows are
called functors. A functor F : C → D assigns objects to objects, arrows to arrows and is compatible with
the four operations (domain, codomain, identity and composition).
Let us present three standard constructions in category theory, the comma category, the graph of a
functor and the category over an object. The second construction is a particular case of the first and the
third of the second. Let F : A → C and G : B → C be two functors with the same codomain. The comma
category F |G is a category whose objects are arrows in C of the form
f : F (A)→ G(B),
where A ∈ A and B ∈ B. An arrow between f and g is a commutative square. The graph of a functor
F : A → C is defined as the comma category F |1, where 1 = 1C : C → C is the identity functor. In the
special case where the functor F is equal to hom(−, C) for some object C ∈ C, the graph of this functor
is called the category over C and is denoted C|C . This is our main structure. Objects in C|C are given by
arrows to C, p : X → C, q : Y → C, etc. Arrows f : p→ q are commutative triangles,
X
f //
p   
Y
q
C
Example 2.2 Let Sets|2 be the category of sets over 2, where 2 = {0, 1} and Sets is the category of sets.
Objects in Sets|2 are functions from a set to {0, 1} and morphisms are commuting triangles,
G1 f //
Ψ ""
G2
Φ||
{0, 1}
In the previous triangle, Ψ and Φ are objects of Sets|2 and f is a function satisfying Φf = Ψ.
As we mention before, this category is relevant in classical logic. We can assign a true/false value to
every element of G1 and/or G2 in a consistent manner. We say that P ∈ G1 (assume P is a proposition
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in the space G1) is true if Ψ(P ) = 1, else we say that P is false. Even more so, assume that we have a
map f : G1 → G2 such that Φf = Ψ, then the truth or falsity of P is unchanged via f , that is f(P ) is true
if and only if P is true,
f(P ) is true ⇐⇒ 1 = Φ(f(P )) = Ψ(P )⇐⇒ P is true
In the logos approach we generalize the category Sets|2 extending Sets to Gph and the set 2 to the interval
[0, 1].
Now that we have some basic facts and constructions from category theory, let us review the topos
approach and how it can handle mixed states. For an introduction to the topos approach see [10] or [24].
The topos approach makes use of the definition of context category and of spectral presheaf. Let H be
a Hilbert space and consider V(H) the set of commutative subalgebras V ⊆ B(H) of bounded operators
(with identity). Using the natural order in V(H), we can consider it as a category. We call V(H) the context
category. To each V ∈ V(H) (V ⊆ B(H) is a commutative subalgebra with identity), we assign its Gelfand
spectrum (a compact topological space). This assignment, denoted Σ, is called the spectral presheaf. The
topos approach is particulary interested in some particular subobjects of Σ. A subobject S is called clopen
if S(V ) is a clopen7 subset of Σ(V ) for all V ∈ V(H). We denote the set of clopen-subobjects as Subcl(Σ).
The authors construct a map δ : P(H) → Subcl(Σ) called daseinisation of projection operators which
sends each projector Pi to a clopen subobject δ(P ), where P(H) denotes the set of projectors in H. The
basic idea behind this construction is to recover classical physics. For each V ∈ V(H), the space Σ(V ) has
to be interpreted as a state space and for each projector P , the subset δ(P )(V ) has to be interpreted as a
proposition in the state space Σ(V ). In summary, according to the slogan quantum physics is equivalent
to classical physics in the appropriate topos, [21], the topos approach defines for each V ∈ V(H), a state
space and a Boolean logic (all subject to compatibilities conditions).
In [18, 21] Isham and Doe¨ring make an attempt to incorporate to the topos approach the notions of
probability and density matrices. In order to do so, they extend their previous constructions [21, p. 6].
As they [21, p. 3] argue: “Probabilities are thereby built into the mathematical structures in an intrinsic
manner. They are tied up with the internal logic of the topos and do not show up as external entities to
be introduced when speaking about experiments” The authors define the presheaf [0, 1]≥ given by [0, 1]-
valued, nowhere-increasing functions on V(H). In other words, if p ∈ [0, 1]≥, then p(V ) ∈ [0, 1] for all
V ∈ V(H) and if V ′ ⊆ V we have p(V ′) ≥ p(V ). Now, given a density matrix ρ, the authors constructed a
map µρ : Subcl(Σ)→ [0, 1]≥ such that, when restricted to the image of δ and taking minimum over V(H),
they recover Born’s rule,
min
V ∈V(H)
µρ(δ(P ))(V ) := Tr(ρP )
The general definition of µρ to the whole set Subcl(Σ) is rather technical and non-trivial. In fact, several
alternative constructions are needed in order to prove the previous formula. The basic idea behind their
construction is that a density matrix ρ defines a probability measure on each state space Σ(V ).
At this point it becomes important to make some remarks about the topos program. Even though the
authors of the present paper believe the topos approach is a very interesting and original proposal, it has
several mathematical and philosophical drawbacks. From a mathematical point of view, it is evident that
it is necessary to adapt all the previous formalism to the new mathematical constructions in order to be
able to incorporate mixed states. The result of this process is the creation of a very complex and elaborated
theory which is difficult to follow even for an expert in the mathematical field. Furthermore, it is not even
clear if the results in the previous formulation are still valid. But also from a philosophical point of view
there seems to exist a tension between, on the one hand, a supposedly realist approach to physics which
7A clopen subset in a topological space is a set both open and closed.
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attempts to talk about systems with well defined properties,8 and on the other, a neo-Bohrian scheme9
which makes explicit use of several anti-realist ideas (e.g., that ‘reality is contextual’).
3 Beyond Purity and Mixtures in the Logos Approach
While the topos approach is considered by many as a neo-Bohrian approach, by following some of the
main ideas present within the works of Einstein, Heisenberg and Pauli —specifically in relation to their
understanding of physical theories— the logos presents a line of research exactly in the opposite direction.
Indeed, within the logos, taking as a standpoint the orthodox mathematical formalism we attempt to
restore an objective-invariant account of QM in which there are no preferred bases or factorizations and
subjects become —as Einstein required— completely detached from the theoretically represented state of
affairs. We do so by willingly paying the price of abandoning the classical metaphysical account of reality
in terms of ‘systems’ and ‘properties’ —which the topos approach, following Bohr, wants to retain at al
costs— and introducing a new non-classical representation in which the physical notions of power and
potentia play an essential role. By staying close to the operational invariance of the Born rule, our main
interest becomes the category Gph|[0,1] of graphs over the interval [0, 1]. Let us begin by reviewing some
properties of the category of graphs. First, we give an example of a graph coming from the quantum
formalism,
Example 3.1 Let H be Hilbert space and let Ψ be a vector, ‖Ψ‖ = 1. Take G as the set of observables
with the commutation relation given by QM, the quantum commutation relation. This relation is reflexive,
symmetric but not transitive, hence G is a non-complete10 graph.
Definition 3.2 Let G be a graph. A context is a complete subgraph (or aggregate) inside G. A maximal
context is a context not contained properly in another context. If we do not indicate the opposite, when
we refer to contexts we will be implying maximal contexts.
For example, let P1, P2 be two nodes of a graph G. Then, {P1, P2} is a context if P1 is related to P2,
P1 ∼ P2. Saying differently, if there exists an edge between P1 and P2. In general, a collection of nodes
{Pi}i∈I ⊆ G determine a context if Pi ∼ Pj for all i, j ∈ I. Equivalently, if the subgraph with nodes {Pi}i∈I
is complete.
Theorem 3.3 Let H be a Hilbert space and let G be the graph of immanent powers with the commutation
relation given by QM. It then follows that:
1. The graph G contains all the contexts (or quantum perspectives).
2. Each context is capable of generating the whole graph G.
Proof: See [11]. 
8As remarked by Do¨ring and Isham in [19]: “When dealing with a closed system, what is needed is a realist interpretation
of the theory, not one that is instrumentalist. The exact meaning of ‘realist’ is infinitely debatable, but, when used by
physicists, it typically means the following: (1) The idea of “a property of the system” (i.e. “the value of a physical quantity”)
is meaningful, and representable in the theory. (2) Propositions about the system are handled using Boolean logic. This
requirement is compelling in so far as we humans think in a Boolean way. (3) There is a space of “microstates” such that
specifying a microstate leads to unequivocal truth values for all propositions about the system. The existence of such a state
space is a natural way of ensuring that the first two requirements are satisfied. The standard interpretation of classical physics
satisfies these requirements, and provides the paradigmatic example of a realist philosophy in science. On the other hand,
the existence of such an interpretation in quantum theory is foiled by the famous Kochen-Specker theorem.”
9The topos approach has been developed explicitly as a neo-Bohrian attempt to understand QM. A reference to the Danish
physicist which has become completely explicit not only in the works of Chris Heunen, Klaas Landsman and Bas Spitters,
but also in the works of Vasilios Karakostas and Elias Zafiris.
10A graph is complete if there is an edge between two arbitrary nodes.
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In the logos approach we work with the category Gph|[0,1]. An object in Gph|[0,1] consists of a map
Ψ : G → [0, 1], where G is a graph. Intuitively, Ψ assigns a potentia to each node of the graph G.
Specifically, to each node P ∈ G, we assign a number Ψ(P ), but this time, Ψ(P ) is a number between
0 and 1. Then, in order to provide a map to the graph of immanent powers, we use the Born rule. We
remark that in the logos scheme the Born rule is not an axiom added to the theory which would require an
independent derivation —as argued, for example, by Deutsch and Wallace [15, 39]— but a consequence of
the orthodox mathematical formalism itself. Gleason’s theorem [25] is just an answer to the mathematical
problem of defining all measures on the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space. Gleason’s theorem derives
the Born rule as the natural measure for QM, and at the same time precludes the possibility of two valued
measures —which is also related to the famous result by Kochen and Specker (see [38, 10] for a detailed
analysis). Thus, to each power P ∈ G, we assign through the Born rule the number p = Ψ(P ), where p is
a number between 0 and 1 called potentia. As discussed in detail in [10], we call this map Ψ : G → [0, 1] a
Potential State of Affairs (PSA for short). Summarizing, we have the following:
Definition 3.4 Let H be a Hilbert space and let ρ be a density matrix. Take G as the graph of immanent
powers with the quantum commutation relation. To each immanent power P ∈ G apply the Born rule to get
the number Ψ(P ) ∈ [0, 1], which is called the potentia (or intensity) of the power P . Then, Ψ : G → [0, 1]
defines an object in Gph|[0,1]. We call this map a Potential State of Affairs (or a PSA for short).
Intuitively, we can picture a PSA as a table,
Ψ : G(H)→ [0, 1], Ψ :

P1 → p1
P2 → p2
P3 → p3
...
Thus, an abstract vector in Hilbert space (or equivalently, a density matrix) without refeernce to a basis
provides a table of intensive powers describing an objective PSA. In this frame, the Born rule, contrary to
the orthodox interpretation —followed also by the topos approach [21]—, acquires an objective reference,
namely, the intensive invariant measure (i.e., the potentia) of all quantum powers. As stressed in the logos
approach, the experimental account of such intensive quantification must be obviously acquired through a
statistical analysis. Unlike in the orthodox interpretation of the Born rule, a single measurement outcome
cannot be regarded as the meaningful reference of theoretical prediction. Single outcomes simply do not
provide enough information to consistently refer to the number p which pertains to the interval (0, 1). Or
in other words, a single measurement result cannot provide the value of the potentia of a power, we always
must require many measurements of the same power in order to estimate its intensity (see [5, 8]).
In this way, the logos approach departs from the well known positivist idea according to which physical
theories predict measurements that can be restricted to yes-no elementary tests. This idea is explained by
Asher Peres [34, p. 202] in the following way: “We start with some definitions and propositions which are
not controversial. There are ‘elementary tests’ (yes-no experiments) labelled A, B, C, . . . Their outcomes
are labelled a, b, c, ... = 1 (yes) or 0 (no). In quantum theory, these elementary tests are represented
by projection operators.” It is this idea —considered by many as “not controversial”— which implies the
(metaphysical) imposition of a binary reference to physical existence. After this definition, there is also a
—very controversial— shift from the empirical finding of actual measurement outcomes (observables) to
the metaphysical reference of projection operators now understood as preexistent properties of quantum
systems (see section 2 and also [7]). As Peres continues to explain:
“The simplest observables are those for which all the coefficients ar are either 0 or 1. These observables
correspond to tests which ask yes-no questions (yes = 1, no = 0). They are called projection operators,
or simply projectors, for the following reason: For any normalized vector v, one can define a matrix
Pv = vv
†, with the properties P 2v = Pv and Pvu = vv
†u = v〈v, u〉 (3.52) The last expression is a vector
parallel to v, for any u, unless 〈v, u〉 = 0. In geometric terms, Pvu is the projection of u along the
direction of v.” [34, p. 66]
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It is by imposing this binary restriction to the values of projection operators that, as explicitly shown by
the Kochen-Specker theorem [32], one reaches a contradiction. Like many others today, Peres [34, p. 14]
concludes that therefore: “Quantum physics [...] is incompatible with the proposition that measurements
discover some unknown but preexisting reality.” This conclusion goes back to Bohr’s analysis of QM and
his insistence that the most important (epistemological) lesson to be learnt from QM is that, we subjects,
are not only spectators but also actors in the great drama of (quantum) existence. However, as we have
demonstrated in [10] through the explicit development of an intensive non-contextuality theorem, this is
simply not true. When considering the Born rule as computing intensive values —something which is
natural from a mathematical physical perspective which understands that invariance is the key for any
consistent representation—, objectivity can be restored and QM becomes compatible with the proposition
that (statistical) measurements discover an unknown but preexistent (potential) reality. Of course, the
price we have willingly paid is to give up the classical (metaphysical) representation of reality in terms
of actual ‘systems’ and ‘properties’. An idea which regardless of its serious —both mathematical and
conceptual— difficulties, has been dogmatically retained in almost all interpretations of QM.
To sum up, some important remarks go in order:
I. Our Logos approach makes explicit the existence of two distinct levels of mathematical representation
regarding vectors. On the one hand, we have the PSA, i.e., an abstract vector in Hilbert space Ψ;
and on the other hand, we have the particular basis-representation of the PSA in a specific context;
i.e., the vector written in a basis |ψ〉 which we call a quantum perspective. While the first level
is obviously non-contextual, the second level is explicitly contextual or basis dependent (see for a
detailed analysis [11]). In the logos approach we have not only different names for these different
concepts but also a notation which makes explicit this fundamental distinction right from the start.
While we use capital Greek letters, e.g. Ψ, to refer to an abstract vector (or PSA), we apply Dirac’s
notation, e.g. |ψ〉, when making reference to a specific experimental context.
II. The interpretation of the Born rule as an intensive quantification of powers (projection operators)
allows to bypass the need of a binary valuation. But more importantly, it provides a global inten-
sive valuation which escapes the constraints of the Kochen-Specker theorem allowing to restore an
objective reference to the quantum formalism [10].
III. The logos approach embraces the shift from a binary understanding of certainty to an intensive one.
From this standpoint, the number that we find by applying the Born rule is not a measure of ‘lack
of knowledge’ of an inaccurate representation of an Actual State of Affairs —which QM denied can
be given in the first place. It is, on the very contrary, an objective account of the potentia of the
powers constituting an objective and invariant Potential State of Affairs. As a direct consequence,
the distinction between pure state and mixed state becomes completely irrelevant [5, 8].
4 The Invariant-Operational Role of Bases in QM
As it is well known, Bohr’s contextual interpretation of QM was presented within his influential reply [2] to
the famous EPR paper [23]. Bohr imposed as a pre-requisit, in order to make reference to the properties
of a quantum system, the need to specify the context of measurement —something that was codified,
in mathematical terms, in the choice of a (preferred) basis or complete set of commuting observables.
He presented this requirement knowing already that it was not possible to consistently assign a global
(binary) valuation to all properties of a quantum system. As it was early remarked by Schro¨dinger [36, p.
156]: “[...] if I wish to ascribe to the model at each moment a definite (merely not exactly known to me)
state, or (which is the same) to all determining parts definite (merely not exactly known to me) numerical
values, then there is no supposition as to these numerical values to be imagined that would not conflict with
some portion of quantum theoretical assertions.” Bohr had already welcome the idea that: “We must, in
general, be prepared to accept the fact that a complete elucidation of one and the same [quantum] object
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may require diverse points of view which defy a unique description.” Consequently, his interpretational
maneuvers were not intending to find a consistent representation for the theory of quanta. That was a task
he considered as hopeless for the theory of quanta. The lack of unity and consistency within theoretical
representation in QM implied a silent but radical shift of the role —and understanding— of reference
frames (or bases) in physical theories. Following Bohr’s contextuality, the choice of a preferred basis begun
to be regarded as conditioning the possibility to refer to a specific sub-set of properties of a quantum
system. Let us discuss this kernel point in some detail.
At least before Bohr’s contextual interpretation of QM, operational invariance of mathematical for-
malisms played an essential role in physical theories as providing the conditions of possibility for a subject-
independent representation of a state of affairs. Physical theories provided on the one hand, an abstract
definition of objects, and on the other, a way to conceive the particular states of these objects (or systems)
through the specification of a reference frame (or basis) which, in turn, could be related to observations
in the lab. In theoretical physics, while the abstract definition of an object is basis independent, its con-
nection to experience always requires the specification of a reference frame in which the specific values of
the properties characterizing the object can be analyzed accordingly. Thus, one thing is to provide the
definition, in general terms, of a physical object or system, say a ‘field’ or a ‘particle’, and a very different
thing is to consider the specific state of a ‘field’ or a ‘particle’ within a given situation, something which
necessarily requires the consideration of a reference frame from which the more specific representation
of the state can be then given. In physics, there can be no representation of a state independent of a
reference frame for it is only through the specification of a viewpoint that the values of properties acquire
meaning. One might think of a dog as an object existing within classical space-time, with properties such
as position and momentum. However, the values of these properties require the specification of a physical
perspective of analysis. Consider the situation of a dog running across a street. As it is well known, its
representation will obviously depend on the particular frame of reference. While the velocity of the dog
might be vd for someone next to it drinking a coffee in a bar, it will differ from the velocity described by
someone in a car vd − vc. What is essential is that in order to give consistency to the many possible basis
dependent representations of the dynamical properties of the dog, classical mechanics makes use of the
so called Galilean transformations. These transformations secure an invariant type representation of the
state of the system in such a way that all reference-frame dependent representations can be regarded as
different and yet referring to the the same state of the object. The important aspect introduced by this
type of representational-invariance is that it allows, through the transformations, to provide a consistent
translation between the multiple basis-dependent theoretical representations of the same state of the same
object. In physical theories all this is also formulated in mathematical terms. A system considered in
terms of a set of actual (definite valued) properties can be thought as a map from the set of properties to
the {0, 1}. More specifically, a system S might be regarded as a function Ψ : S → {0, 1} from the set of
properties to {0, 1} satisfying certain compatibility conditions (see [10]). We say that the property P ∈ S
is true if Ψ(P ) = 1 and P ∈ S is false if Ψ(P ) = 0. The description of a system with respect to a reference
frame is formalized by the fact that the morphism G satisfies ΦG = Ψ. Diagrammatically,
SB1
Ψ ##
G // SB2
Φ{{
{0, 1}
The transformation does not only provide the properties which are true but also the consistent values of
the dynamical properties such as position, velocity, etc.,
P iB1_

SB1

G // SB2

P iB2_

v(P iB1) R v(P iB2)
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Let us explain the previous diagrams in a more explicit way. The set SB1 consists of the dynamical
properties of the system S in the reference frame B1. The map from SB1 to R sends a property P iB1 to its
real value v(P iB1) (for example, the velocity or the position). Same situation with SB2 . The fact that the
diagram in the middle commutes implies that the values of the properties in the reference frame B1 are
mapped under G in a compatible way to values in the reference frame B2. For example, the velocity of a
car viewed from a speed train will have a different but compatible value, under the transformation G, with
respect to the velocity of the same car viewed from the train-station. Thus, given the representation of
the state of the system SB1 in a particular reference frame, B1, we can imply through the transformation
G, how the (same) state of the system will be consistently represented from any other frame of reference,
B2, as SB2 . This type of invariance can be also extended for the dynamical properties of the system (see
[9]). As discussed in [10, Sect. 1], the conjunction of systems, Si (with i = 1...n), can also give rise to
a consistent Actual State of Affairs (ASA) composed of many systems. Due to the value-invariance of
the properties with respect to reference frames, the context of experimental analysis (reference frame or
basis) becomes completely irrelevant for the theoretical characterization of the real physical situation. It
is this particular invariant feature of physical representation which allows to talk about a real state of
affairs, independent of any subjective perspective or viewpoint. And as Einstein would constantly remark,
it is also this which allows to regard any particular empirical subject (linked to a mathematical basis) as
detached from the representation of the whole course of events.
Of course, this does not mean that reference frames are unimportant in physics. On the very contrary,
in theoretical physics the reference frame is essential in order to describe any situation or experiment in
a lab. Actual experiments are not just abstract mathematical or conceptual representations, they require
the specification of the conditions under which the testing takes place and becomes possible. The most
important of these conditions is the reference frame itself. The position of an object has meaning only
with respect (or relative) to a reference frame. Without the specification of a viewpoint it is impossible
to refer to the state of a system. As famously remarked by Einstein [22, p. 26]: “The concept does not
exist for the physicist until he has the possibility of discovering whether or not it is fulfilled in an actual
case.” And this is the reason why, the Meaningful Operational Statements produced by theories are always
basis-dependent. They cannot be given without the specification of a reference frame (or basis).
Meaningful Operational Statement: Every operational statement within a theory capable of predicting
the outcomes of possible measurements must be considered as meaningful with respect to the representation
of physical reality provided by that theory in connection to a specific frame of reference or basis.
Any theory which attempts to provide an objective (subject-independent) representation of a state of affairs
must be able to refer to such meaningful operational statements in an operational-invariant manner, that
is, in a way in which all possible results of experiments can be consistently pictured as a consequence of a
preexistent theoretically represented moment of unity —e.g., the state of an object. The many reference
frames dependent representations must be able to provide a consistent account of the same state of affairs.
This is the essential content of the Greek meaning of understanding —which Greeks often related to the
famous relation between the one and the many. As Heisenberg [26, p. 63] explained: “‘Understanding’
probably means nothing more than having whatever ideas and concepts are needed to recognize that a great
many different phenomena are part of coherent whole.” But in the case of QM, Bohr explicitly rejected the
very possibility of providing a consistent picture of a state of affairs independently of the choice of the basis
(or reference frame). As it was later on explicitly shown through KS theorem [9, 32], he was right to point
out that if attempting to restore a binary representation in terms of definite valued properties of systems
the enterprise would be doomed to failure, but he was wrong to argue that this could not be avoided in
general. As it was explicitly shown by the logos approach [10] the consideration of an intensive valuation is
able to advance a global consistent invariant account of the mathematical formalism which bypassing the
KS theorem, in turn, also allows to provide an objective (subject-independent) representation of the state
of affaires described by the theory of quanta. On the contrary, leaving behind objectivity —namely, the
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search for a consistent unity for the representation of phenomena—, Bohr embraced an intersubjective11
reference to observabe phenomena and stressed that it was the communication between subjects that
which allowed to avoid any sort of ambiguity [14, p. 98]: “The description of atomic phenomena has
in these respects a perfectly objective character, in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any
individual observer and that therefore... no ambiguity is involved in the communication of observation.”
Bohr shifted the meaning of ‘experiment’ from the consistent representation of a real state of affairs to the
possibility of communication between subjects. As he [40, p. 7] argued “the very word experiment refers
to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned.”
Adding to this confusion, since Dirac’s textbook formulation there has been a deep problem in order
to address the meaning of states and systems in QM (see [13]). Even today, there still exists within
the literature a deep and widespread disorientation related to the meaning of these notions which are
commonly applied in inconsistent manners; sometimes referring to abstract mathematics while others to
unrepresented “small particles”. We believe that the reason behind this situation is the inadequate link,
introduced by Dirac, between the mathematical formalism and these physical notions. While in physics
a state makes reference to the specific features of an object, Dirac presented an interpretation of the
mathematical formalism in which each state, represented by a ket vector, was related to an observable.
As a consequence, it made perfect sense to argue that the same system could be represented in terms of
different states, depending on the basis:
“[E]ach state of a dynamical system at a particular time corresponds to a ket vector, the correspondence
being such that if a state results from the superposition of certain other states, its corresponding ket
vector is expressible linearity in terms of the corresponding ket vectors of the other states, and conversely.
Thus the state R results from a superposition of the states A and B when the corresponding ket vectors
are connected by |R〉 = c1|A〉 + c2|B〉 .” [17, p. 16]
In this way, the meaning of sameness as related to reference frames became completely inverted. Reference
frames (or bases) did not make anymore reference to the same state of the same object, but instead to
different states —and consequently, different observables. The presupposition that a system could only
have a single state at a time was then left behind as a classical prejudice. Each basis made then reference
to a specific set of possible states of a system. The state, or superposition of states, was determined by the
choice of the basis regardless of any invariant theoretical condition between them. Dirac —in a Bohrian
fashion— simply blamed quantum superpositions for being non-classical: “The nature of the relationships
which the superposition principle requires to exist between the states of any system is of a kind that
cannot be explained in terms of familiar physical concepts. One cannot in the classical sense picture a
system being partly in each of two states and see the equivalence of this to the system being completely
in some other state.” According to Dirac, this implied a limit in the possibility of representation itself.
But this was not a problem. Dirac had already “remarked that the main object of physical science is not
the provision of pictures, but the formulation of laws governing phenomena and the application of these
laws to the discovery of phenomena. If a picture exists, so much the better; but whether a picture exists
of not is a matter of only secondary importance.” According to Dirac, it is “important to remember that
science is concerned only with observable things”, consequently, the reference to superpositions should be
regarded only as an abstract mathematical game which does not need to refer to anything real —even
though QM talks about small particles. What Dirac did not seem to recognize —maybe because he was
not a physicist— was that his interpretation implied a much deeper commitment, one which precluded
the possibility for QM of an invariant operational discourse. The abstract invariance of unit vectors with
respect to the trace seemed enough to Dirac. 12 13
11Bohr systematically referred to intersubjective statements as objective ones.
12It is interesting to notice that during the 1940s and 1950s Dirac’s state-vectorial formulation was established in textbook
QM through the essential introduction of the notion of pure state. A notion which makes even more explicit the double
reference, on the one hand, to the abstract invariance of a unit vector, and on the other, to the non-invariant certain
prediction of a single observable (see for a detailed discussion [13]).
13Today, the reference to states has become explicitly instrumental. As pointed out by Chris Timpson, for many contem-
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Escaping from these orthodox set of definitions and going back to an analysis of the mathematical
formalism as related to its invariant-operational —and representational— conditions, an outmost impor-
tant feature of our logos approach is that it allows us to distinguish explicitly between these two just
mentioned levels of mathematical representation through the notions of Potential State of Affairs (PSA)
and Quantum Perspective. While the PSA provides a purely abstract basis independent representation,
the quantum perspective makes explicit reference to a specific context or basis dependent representation
of that same PSA. Due to the operational-invariance of the Born rule, all quantum perspectives can be
considered simultaneously without the inconsistencies found in Dirac’s formulation —which extends the
number of states not only for different bases, but also, even for the same representation. Consequently,
we are able to restore an objective representation in which measurements can be regarded as epistemic
forms of testing the physical representation of a (potential) state of affairs. In order to make explicit these
different levels of physical representation the logos approach introduces a new important distinction within
Dirac’s notation. While abstract vectors —which refer to a PSA— are noted with capital Greek letters,
we retain Dirac’s notation in order to refer to vectors written in a specific basis —which we interpret as
a quantum perspective. Given a PSA, Ψ, defined by an abstract unit vector, v, and given a basis (or
context), C = {|w1〉, . . . , |wk〉}, we can write v as a quantum superposition or, as we shall now call it for
reasons that will become obvious, a Quantum Perspective:
QPΨ,C :=
k∑
i=1
ci|wi〉.
In fact, we can assign to Ψ a multiplicity of different superpositions (or quantum perspectives):
QPΨ,C1 , QPΨ,C2 , . . . , QPΨ,Cn
one for each context {C1, . . . , Cn}. Even more, as remarked in Theorem 5.2, each quantum superposition
can generate ( ) not only the other superpositions (by simply making a change of basis) but also the
whole PSA,
QPΨ,C1  QPΨ,C2  . . . QPΨ,Cn  Ψ.
It is also true, as already remarked in [4], that from a mathematical viewpoint there is a class of equivalence
between the different representations which allow us to write the following equalities:
QPΨ,C1 = QPΨ,C2 = . . . = QPΨ,Cn = Ψ.
This equivalence relation obviously does not imply that these different quantum perspectives are making
reference to a physical system constituted by properties. In fact, there is no Global Binary Valuation of
the properties considered from different reference frames (for a more detailed discussion see [4, 9, 10, 11]).
A useful visual account of the just mentioned definitions and levels is provided in the logos approach
through the use of graphs in which the partially filled nodes represent powers with their respective potentia.
Graphs allow us to picture simultaneously the whole PSA, Ψ, the different context dependent quantum
perspectives, QPΨ,Ci , as well as each different power with its respective invariant potentia computed via
the Born rule. Let us stress the fact that in this new account of the formalism each node —which has
a one to one relation to a ket— singles out a power, something that in Dirac’s formulation was related
to a state or an observable. While in the logos approach, given an abstract unit-vector, all kets (i.e., all
powers) make reference to the same (potential) state of affairs (quantum perspectives being just particular
basis-dependent representations), in Dirac’s formulation each ket singles out a particular state and each
porary researchers, the quantum state does not represent “how things are in an external, objective world, it merely represents
what information one has. Mermin (2001), Peierls (1991), Wheeler (1990) and Zeilinger (1999) have all endorsed this kind
of view. Hartle (1968, p. 709) provides an excellent summary: ‘The state is not an objective property of an individual system
but is that information, obtained from a knowledge of how a system was prepared, which can be used for making predictions
about future measurements’.”
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different basis a set of them, all of them different between each other. While in Dirac’s formulation there is
no global consistency of values, in the logos approach all quantum perspectives can be consistently referred
—through the operational-invariance of the Born rule— to the same Potential State of Affairs —restoring
in this way an objective (subject-independent) representation.
Fig. 1: A PSA, Ψ, with two different Quantum Perspectives, 1 and n, pointed out.
In figure 1 we can clearly see that even though there is a sense in which QPΨ,C1 = QPΨ,Cn , there is also
an obvious sense in which QPΨ,C1 6= QPΨ,Cn . An obvious difference between them is that the quantum
perspectives QPΨ,C1 and QPΨ,Cn are not making reference to the same section of the graph Ψ. According
to the logos approach, each one of these different quantum perspectives is making reference to a different
subset of powers and consequently to different experimental arrangements. Each one of them provides a set
of meaningful operational statements related to the statistical testing of powers and their specific potentia.
Each quantum perspective provides thus, objective (intensive) information of the same (potential) state
of affairs.
Without loosing any generality, it is interesting to notice that the following theorem guarantees that
the PSA representation is equivalent to the density matrix representation:
Theorem 4.1 The knowledge of a particular PSA, Ψ, is equivalent to the knowledge of the density matrix
ρΨ. In particular, if Ψ is defined by a normalized vector vΨ, ‖vΨ‖ = 1, then we can recover the vector
from Ψ.
Proof: See [11]. 
As remarked above, reference frames are essential in making explicit the operational content of a theory.
Through the use of graphs the logos representation is capable to account for both non-contextual and
contextual levels simultaneously. While the whole graph provides an account of the non-contextual PSA,
Ψ, each context makes reference to a particular experimental (quantum) perspective, QPΨ,C , in which
the nodes (powers) and their intensive values (potentia) computed through the Born rule can be exposed
through a statistical analysis.
Now that we have the mathematical definition of a PSA, let us go back to the analysis of pure states.
For simplicity, let us work in C2. The following analysis can be carried out without difficulties to any
dimension. As we defined mathematically (Definition 1.2), a pure state is a unit vector v ∈ C2 or in terms
of density matrices, it is a 2× 2 hermitian matrix ρ of the form |v〉〈v|,
ρ =
(|a|2 ab
ab |b|2
)
, v = (a, b), |a|2 + |b|2 = 1.
Notice that
ρ2 = |v〉〈v|v〉〈v| = |v〉〈v| = ρ
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and
Tr(ρ2) = |a|4 + |a|2|b|2 + |a|2|b|2 + |b|4 = |a|2(|a|2 + |b|2) + (|a|2 + |b|2)|b|2 = 1.
Let us translate this representation to our formalism. First, the graph of immanent powers G in C2 can
be pictured as follows,
Fig. 2: Graph of immanent powers in dimension two.
The previous graph continues to the left and right indefinitely.
Let us choose the basis v1 = (1, 0) and v2 = (0, 1). This is represented as choosing a maximal context,
that is, a complete set of commuting observables C = {|v1〉〈v1|, |v2〉〈v2|},
Fig. 3: Graph with the context C pointed out.
Now, we define the PSA Ψ : G → [0, 1] by using the Born rule. In this example,
Tr(ρ · |v1〉〈v1|) = |a|2, Tr(ρ · |v2〉〈v2|) = |b|2.
We picture the restriction of Ψ to the context C as
Fig. 4: The context C with the assigned potentia to each power.
But of course, we can also choose another basis. In fact, we can choose the orthonormal basis given by
v = (a, b) and w = (−b, a), a, b ∈ R. Over this context, the representation of Ψ is rather easy,
Fig. 5: Another context showing a pure state.
As we mentioned above, it is only this particular basis which contains a clear physical operational coun-
terpart relating ‘the state’ to the ‘certain prediction of a measurement outcome’. Indeed, since —following
the empiricist-positivist agenda— it is only the actual and observable which can find a place in some
model of the theory, certain knowledge becomes restricted to actual observable values.14 On the contrary,
in the logos approach, none of these powers is problematic since all of them provide objective intensive
knowledge of the state of affairs described by QM [5] independently of the choice of the context.
Through the use of graphs we can now visualize very easily the fundamental equivocity present within
the different —both contextual and non-contextual— definition(s) of pure state already addressed in
[13]. As we discussed above, while the mathematical definition makes reference to an abstract context-
independent vector (i.e., an invariant with respect to the trace), the operational counterpart is clearly
context-dependent and restricts itself to a particular basis (i.e., the basis in which there exists one power
with potentia equal to 1). The following graph (figure 6) shows the simultaneous reference of the notion of
pure state, first, to an abstract vector in Hilbert space, second, to a vector represented in a specific basis,
and third, to a single eigenvector whose eigenvalue is 1. Clearly, each of these mathematical elements
possesses not only a distinct mathematical definition, they also codify a completely different type of
information. In the logos approach, through the use of graphs we understand visually the confusion present
in the orthodox literature according to which a pure state makes reference, at the same time, firstly, to the
14Something that in Dirac’s formulation also links vector kets to the definition of states.
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whole PSA; secondly, to the single filled node; and thirdly, also to any maximal context containing this
node. The scrambling of these three distinct levels of mathematical representation is clearly problematic
since we have explicitly shown in the logos approach that there is obviously a difference between considering
the whole graph (i.e., a PSA Ψ), a particular section of the graph (i.e., a quantum perspective QPΨ,C),
and a particular node of the graph (i.e., an intensive power Pi).
Fig. 6: The orthodox referential equivocity present within the definition of pure state(s).
To summarize, while in the topos approach it is necessary to redefine the formalism in order to incorporate
mixed states (matrices of rank grater than 1), in the logos approach all matrices can be considered on
equal footing —as PSAs or quantum perspectives— right from the start, without the need to introduce the
distinction between pure sates and mixtures. All matrices are treated in a natural and simple way without
having to abandon the orthodox formalism or adding anything “by hand”, like ‘particles’ or ‘collapses’.
While the topos approach attempts to restore the orthodox ignorance interpretation of mixtures, the logos
approach avoids any reference to purity and mixtures right from the start. While the topos approach
remains tied —in a Bohrian fashion— to the contextual reference of a binary (actual) state of affairs, the
logos restores the possibility to think of QM as a theory capable of producing an invariant-objective (basis
and subject-independent) representation of a (potential) state of affairs in a consistent manner. Finally,
while the topos is extremely complicated, both formally and conceptually, the logos approach presents a
simple introduction to QM through the theory of graphs as well as an intuitive conceptual explanation of
what is really going on according to QM through the notion of intensive power (see for a detailed discussion
of the intuitive content of the logos approach [10, 11, 12]).
5 An Intensive-Invariant Representation of Quantum Reality
In a truly Spinozian spirit, we might say that, in the logos approach —contrary to orthodoxy— there are
no states or bases which can be considered as more important or fundamental than others; all bases in QM
are as important. From a physical standpoint which recognizes that invariance is a necessary condition
for any consistent physical representation there can be no preferred bases. Our representation in terms of
graphs makes explicit the invariant nature of all reference frames which, in turn, provide access to all the
relations present within each specific potential state of affairs. An intensity of a node (a power) equal to 0.5
and an intensity equal to 1, both provide the same complete accurate type of certain intensive knowledge.
The so called actual properties become just a particular case of potential or indefinite properties, just like
probability equal to 1 is a particular value of probability not essentially different from probability equal
to 0.5 or 0.77. Actual (or certain) properties are just a particular case of potential properties, those with
potentia =1. Consequently, also from a purely mathematical perspective, a (pure) state ρ = ρ2 and a
(impure) state ρ 6= ρ2, are regarded as physically equivalent. Both states provide particular graphs with
different tables of powers and potentia, the fact that in the first case there exists a power which has a
potentia = 1 is completely irrelevant both from a physical or mathematical perspective which considers
an intensive form of quantufication.
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Carlo Rovelli has recently argued [35] that Scho¨dinger introduced “the notion of ‘wave function’ ψ,
soon to be evolved into the notion of ‘quantum state’ ψ, endowing it with heavy ontological weight. This
conceptual step was wrong, and dramatically misleading. We are still paying the price for the confusion
it has generated.” Indeed, as we have discussed above, the deep confusion and misunderstanding comes,
partly, from the equivocity introduced by the orthodox notation which is unable to account for the differ-
ent levels of mathematical representation present within the formalism of the theory. But this equivocity
has been created by the inadequate idea according to which ‘QM obviously talks about systems’. Thus,
the problem is not that ψ is understood in ontological terms, the problem is that its understanding has
been dogmatically restricted to the classical atomist representation in terms of space-time systems. In the
logos approach we have provided not only a notation which makes explicit the distinction between the
different mathematical levels of representation, we have also provided a conceptual framework in which
the mathematical formalism finds a natural connection to operationally well defined invariant physical
concepts. While the non-contextual aspect of abstract vectors is described in terms of a PSA, the contex-
tual nature of quantum superpositions is clearly stressed through the reference to ‘quantum perspectives’
or experimental arrangements. In this respect, an important aspect of our logos approach is that all
these new (non-classical) notions possess a physical operational-invariant counterpart. Just like Einstein
required, all these —newly introduced— physical concepts contain the operational conditions allowing to
discover whether or not they are fulfilled in an actual case. In this respect, in order to restore the com-
plete operational equivalence between all projection operators it might be recommendable to return to
Heisenberg’s original formulation of QM in which all matrices, independently of their rank, stand on equal
theoretical and operational footing. It is within this matrix formulation —in which both notions of purity
and mixture becomes untenable— that the logos approach might find its natural extension. Something
we leave for a future work.
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the untenability of the notion of pure state in the orthodox formalism
of QM. Through the aid of graphs we have shown the equivocity present within the different definitions
confused and scrambled in the present literature. We have also shown that through the application of
an intensive analysis it is possible to restore an objective theoretical representation of QM. In this new
scheme it becomes explicit why the distinction between pure state and mixed state is completely irrelevant
both from a mathematical and a physical perspectives.
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